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1 Introduction 
In recent decades, Africa has been the worst performing region of the world in terms of 
poverty reduction (Ravallion and Chen 2000). Between 1987 and 1998 poverty incidence 
remained at 46 per cent, while the number of poor people increased from 217 million to 
290 million.1 Per capita incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) fell by 20 per cent from 
the peak in 1974 to the low in 1994 (World Bank 2002). The 1990s have seen some 
recovery in the SSA in terms of improved macroeconomic management, growth and 
poverty reduction in certain countries (Christiaensen, Demery and Paternostro 2002), and 
there was a modest 4 per cent increase of per capita incomes between 1994 and 2000. But, 
the question still remains as to whether African economies can in general achieve the 
goals of poverty reduction and improvements in human development set out in the 
poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). 
The 1990s have witnessed diverse and interesting experiences across Africa in terms of 
growth and poverty reduction. These deserve closer analysis.2 There is a growing policy 
and research interest in the scope for poverty reduction through pro-poor growth. This 
paper is a contribution to this literature and is organized as follows: section 2 looks at the 
state of income distribution and poverty in Africa, while section 3 reviews pro-poor 
growth indices. Section 4 presents measures of estimates of pro-poor growth for selected 
African countries and looks at the implications for poverty reduction in the case of 
Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique, and South  Africa. Section 5 discusses some policy 
challenges for pro-poor growth in Africa, and section 6 summarizes and concludes our 
discussion.  
2  Trends in income distribution and poverty in Africa 
The Deininger-Squire3 dataset on income distribution shows that Africa is one of the most 
unequal regions in the world, second only to South America (Table 1). In addition, the 
Gini coefficient has varied considerably within short periods of time for many African 
countries. To some extent, this is due to data problems (Deaton 2003), but there are also 
real factors that make incomes and income distributions unstable in Africa. Income 
distribution is strongly affected, for example, by the weather, political changes or policy 
shocks (Easterly 2000). 
Figure 1 shows that the Gini coefficients in Africa are concentrated in the range of 40-55 
per cent.4 Out of the sample of 37 countries, close to half have had a Gini coefficient 
greater than 50 per cent, at least once in the past. This indicates that income distribution is 
                                                 
1   Many people are concerned about the ambiguity in the measurement of poverty. While we say that 
poverty (incidence) declined on the one hand, we see, on the other hand, that the number of poor 
people increased. Observers may in such a case evaluate the situation differently depending on 
whether they are concerned about poverty incidence or the absolute number of poor people. 
2   For example, Mozambique was one of the fastest growing economies in the world in the 1990s, and 
Uganda registered a very strong reduction in poverty. 
3   See Deininger and Squire (1998) for details on the construction of the income distribution datasets. 
4  The solid points represent a linear regression fit. 2 
a serious concern in Africa and that it needs to be understood to facilitate growth 
strategies that benefit the poor. 
Tables 2 and 3 report changes, mainly covering the 1990s, in per capita income and 
income distribution for 17 African countries. We see a decline in the income share of the 
poorest quantile in only six cases, two with positive and five with negative per capita 
income growth, while the share of the poorest quintile increased in eleven cases, nine with 
negative growth and two with positive growth. There is thus no clear trend in inequality in 
this African dataset. The poorest quintiles actually did rather well in maintaining or even 
improving their income shares, but, of course, in absolute terms they still did not do well. 
The absolute income of the poorest quintile increased in only four  cases. In spite of 
Africa’s growth performance being erratic and often negative, its impact on the wellbeing 
of the poor has not been dramatic. Rather, distributional changes have cushioned the 
impact. This finding is consistent with the recent work on the dynamics of poverty in 
Africa (Christiaensen, Demery and Paternostro 2002). Still, there is little that suggests that 
Africa is on track towards the Millennium Goal in terms of poverty reduction. 
Table 1 
Median values of Gini coefficient by region 
Region 1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
Eastern Europe  22.76 21.77 24.93 28.60 
South Asia  31.67 32.32 32.22 31.59 
OECD and High Income Countries  32.86  33.04  32.20  33.20 
East Asia and the Pacific 34.57  34.40  34.42  34.80 
Middle East and North Africa 41.88  43.63  40.80  39.72 
Sub-Saharan Africa  49.90 48.50 39.63 42.30 
Latin America  53.00 49.86 51.00 50.00 
Source:   Deininger and Squire (1998: 263). 
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Source:   WIDER dataset. 3 
Table 2 
Average annual percentage change of quintile income shares and the Gini coefficient 
   Quintiles   
Country Year  Poorest  2nd  3rd  4th  Richest   
Gini 
coefficient
Gambia  1991 vs  1992  113.59  39.10  12.31  -0.92  -10.47 -15.10 
Ghana  1992 vs  1997  1.23  0.33  -0.38 0.09  -0.24  -0.56 
Guinea  1991 vs  1994  28.73  7.81  0.45 -3.92 -2.03  -4.82 
Kenya  1992 vs  1994  21.45  20.14 15.04  9.85  -9.90  -11.82 
Mauritania  1993 vs  1995  9.62 12.19 12.31 10.58  -9.81 -11.57 
Niger  1992 vs  1995  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Nigeria  1991 vs  1997  1.45  -1.44 -2.32 -3.15  2.04  2.01 
Senegal  1991 vs  1994  22.48  14.00 7.65 2.13  -6.32  -8.63 
Tanzania  1991 vs  1993  66.94  38.55 20.90  7.47  -14.88 -19.38 
Uganda  1992 vs  1993  -2.65  5.72 5.85 4.31  -4.43  -4.32 
Zambia  1991 vs  1997  -5.49  -3.06 -2.00 -0.85  1.93  2.67 
Ethiopia  1981 vs  1995  -1.33  -1.07 -0.86 -0.45  1.03  1.51 
Lesotho  1986 vs  1993  -1.35  -2.12  -1.40 0.01 0.51  0.49 
Madagascar  1980 vs  1993  1.28  0.84 0.44 0.00  -0.40  -0.60 
Mali  1989 vs  1994  -8.13  -6.72 -5.46 -2.50  5.03  6.78 
Rwanda  1983 vs  1984  0.00  0.84 -0.90 -0.18  0.21  0.17 
Tunisia  1965 vs  1971  -2.16  -8.94 -6.33 -5.72  4.80  5.35 
Source: Authors’  computations. 
 
Table 3 
Average Annual growth of national and quintile per capita income 
    % change in GDP 
per capita 
in 1996 PPP $ 
 
% change in mean income of the quintiles 
 in 1996 PPP $ 
   µ µ  of Q1  µ of Q2  µ of Q3  µ of Q4  µ of Q5 
Gambia  1991 vs  1992  -3.53  106.05 34.19  8.35  -4.42 -13.63 
Ghana  1992 vs  1997  0.93  2.18 1.26 0.55 1.02 0.69 
Guinea  1991 vs  1994  0.93  29.93 8.81 1.39  -3.02  -1.12 
Kenya  1992 vs  1994  -0.25  21.15 19.85 14.76  9.58 -10.12 
Mauritania  1993 vs  1995  -1.12  8.38 10.93 11.04 9.34  -10.82 
Niger  1992 vs  1995  -0.86  -0.86 -0.86 -0.86 -0.86 -0.86 
Nigeria  1991 vs  1997  -0.38  1.06 -1.81 -2.69 -3.52  1.65 
Senegal  1991 vs  1994  -2.11  19.89  11.59  5.38 -0.03 -8.29 
Tanzania  1991 vs  1993  -1.76  64.00 36.11 18.77 5.58  -16.38 
Uganda  1992 vs  1993  3.96  1.20 9.91  10.04 8.44  -0.64 
Zambia  1991 vs  1997  -4.62  -9.86 -7.55 -6.53 -5.44 -2.78 
Ethiopia  1981 vs  1995  -1.29  -2.60 -2.34 -2.14 -1.74 -0.27 
Lesotho  1986 vs  1993  -0.10  -1.45 -2.22 -1.51 -0.09  0.41 
Madagascar  1980 vs  1993  -2.93  -1.69 -2.11 -2.50 -2.93 -3.32 
Mali  1989 vs  1994  -1.90  -9.88 -8.50 -7.26 -4.36  3.03 
Rwanda  1983 vs  1984  -9.70  -9.70 -8.94  -10.51 -9.87 -9.51 
Tunisia  1965 vs  1971  2.84  0.62 -6.36 -3.66 -3.04  7.77 
Source: Authors’  computations. 4 
Against this background it seems clear that it will not be possible to achieve substantial 
and sustained reductions in poverty without economic growth. The debate beyond this 
has come to focus on whether it is possible to bring about a pattern of growth that is 
particularly beneficial for the poor, and this is the focus of this paper. 
3  Measures of ‘pro-poor’ growth 
In the 1970s the importance of the pattern of growth for poverty reduction was 
discussed under the label ‘redistribution with growth’ (Chenery et al. 1974). The 
resurgence of interest in this issue is largely due to the failure to achieve poverty 
reduction in Africa under the structural adjustment programmes. There has been an 
outpouring of empirical research on the link between growth and poverty (see among 
others, Demery and Squire 1996; Ali 1996; Ravallion and Chen 1997, 2000; Fields 
1998; Collier and Dollar 2000; Easterly 2000; Dollar and Kraay 2000; World Bank 
2000; Geda, Shimeles and Weeks 2002). The advent of the MDGs and the PRSPs has 
underlined the need to explore the interconnection between growth, poverty and income 
distribution. 
The recent discussion of pro-poor growth started with a focus on evaluating the 
percentage change in the income of ‘poor’ people in the course of economic growth 
(Dollar and Kraay 2000; Eastwood and Lipton 2001). Statistical exercises to evaluate 
the elasticities that connect poverty changes with growth are sensitive to functional 
specification as well as the data sources used.5 Besides, one needs some degree of 
conceptualization of what it means when a growth process is pro-poor. Recent literature 
has suggested different ways of measuring pro-poor growth.  
White and Anderson (2000) suggest three measures on pro-poor growth using 
incremental income shares of the poor normalized by their base-year share, population 
share, or some international norm. The first measure implies that the income share of 
the poor population must increase if the growth pattern is to be regarded as pro-poor.6 
Or equivalently, the rate of growth of the mean income of the poor should be greater 
than the rate of growth of the mean income for the whole population. According to the 
second measure, the share of the poor in the income increase should be greater than the 
headcount ratio itself. This implies that the poor should get a share of the income 
increase that is at least as large as their population share if the process is to be 
characterized as pro-poor. The third measure says that the incremental income share of 
the poor should be measured against some international norm, such as the median 
                                                 
5   The elasticity estimates may be affected by variations in the sources of underlying variables. Some use 
distribution data from household surveys and growth data from national accounts, e.g. Ballad 2002; 
Karshenas 2001; Sala-i-Martin 2002. 








. If the LHS is less than 1 growth is said to be anti-poor. Or in other words, this is a 












income shares of the bottom 20 or 40 per cent.7 This measure appears to use some 
convergence rule in the incidence of inequality across the globe. That is, in a growth 
episode, pro-poor growth in this case means that the share of the poorest quantile in the 
growing income equals at least to that of the median of share of the poorest quantile 
around the world. This particular measure assumes that most income shares for the 
poorest quantiles in poor countries are lower than the median share of the poor in the 
world income distribution. 
What we note from these measures is that the focus is on the relative change in the 
income of the poor, not on what happens to poverty as a result. That is, it does not 
matter whether poor people escape poverty or not as a result of growth. We can see this 
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where  yit is income of individual or household i at time t. The numerator on the 
right-hand side is total income of the poor population in period it and the denominator is 













ϕ = =  (2) 
Equation (2) simply states that the share of the income of the poor is a ratio of mean 
income of the poor (µ p) to per capita income of society, µ t, weighted by the proportion 
of poor people or the headcount ratio (Ht). In this case, the rate of growth in the income 
share of the poor will be equal to: 
• • • •
− + = t p t t t H µ µ ϕ  (3) 
where all the variables are in terms of rates of growth. It is clear from equation (3) that 
the share of the income of the poor moves positively with the rate of change in the 
headcount ratio. The implication is that growth could be pro-poor, while the proportion 
of poor people increased. However, in their estimations White and Anderson fix the size 
of the group of poor by only considering the poorest quintile. In addition, if incremental 
income is equally distributed, equation (3) suggests that the rate of change in the income 
share of the poor population will be equal to the rate of change in the headcount ratio.  
The second definition of pro-poor growth by White and Anderson implies an equal 
distribution of the income increase. This is an extremely stringent condition and 
therefore not very useful as a guide for policymakers who are intent in monitoring the 
progress of pro-poor growth. 
                                                 
7  The median income share of the bottom 20 and 40 per cent according to White and Anderson is 5.6 
per cent and 16.7 per cent, respectively.  6 
There are other pro-poor growth measures that have closer connection with poverty 
measures and that satisfy desirable axioms. For example, Kakwani and Pernia (2000) 
propose a measure of pro-poor growth that is derived from poverty elasticities. They use 
the ratio of poverty elasticities with respect to actual growth and distributional neutral 
growth, and define a pro-poor growth index as: 
g η
η
φ =  (4) 
where φ  is their index of pro-poor growth and η  is the elasticity of poverty with respect 
to per capita income (gross elasticity), and η g is the elasticity of poverty with respect to 
per capita income, assuming no change in income distribution. If φ >1, the growth 
process is considered to be pro-poor. If 0<φ <1, economic growth reduces poverty, but 
the ‘inequality effect’ of economic growth is negative so that the poor benefit 
proportionately less from economic growth than the non-poor. This is characterized as 
trickle-down growth. In case of an economic recession, the pro-poor index is inverted to 
be η g/η . The recession will be pro-poor if η <η g. Kakwani and Pernia (2000) also show 
how equation (4) can be decomposed into growth and inequality effects. A growth 
episode is called pro-poor only if inequality declines or remains unchanged. Growth 
episodes accompanied by even the slightest increase in income inequality are 
considered anti-poor. 
Ravallion and Chen (2003) are concerned about this feature and propose a pro-poor 
measure, which focuses mainly on the changes in the income of the poor in a growth 
episode. In addition, their measure is linked to a specific poverty index, that is, Watt’s 
index of poverty,8 which satisfies several desirable axioms. The measure of pro-poor 
growth proposed by Ravallion and Chen starts from the basic idea of changes in the 
income of individual poor people using the cumulative distribution function of income, 
F(y). By definition, if we invert F(Y) at the pth quantile, we get the income of that 
quantile: 
t t t p L p y µ ) ( ' ) ( =  (5) 
Indexing over time and evaluating the growth rate of income of the pth quantile, and 
using the above expression we get: 















p g γ    (6) 
where gt(p) is growth rate in the income of the pth quantile and γ t is the ratio of mean 
per capita income in period t to that in period t-1. In other words, the change in the 
income of an individual in the pth quantile is weighted by the shift parameter in the 
                                                 
8  Watt’s index can be written as: 
dp y z W
h
t t ∫ − =
0
) ln (ln  
 where  z is the poverty line, y income and h the number of poor. 7 
slope of the Lorenz curve. Cumulating (6) up to the proportion of the poor (Ht) gives an 








) (  (7) 
Normalizing equation (7) by the number of poor people we get Ravallion and Chen’s 
(2003) measure of pro-poor growth. The Ravallion and Chen measure of pro-poor 
growth essentially cumulates the rate of change in the income of the population 
identified as poor before growth occurs and takes the average using the number of the 
poor population. This is different from the rate of change in the mean income of the 
poor. The two coincide if each poor person’s income grows at an equal rate.  
Kakwani, Khandker and Son (2003) suggest a measure of pro-poor growth, which is a 
generalization of the Ravallion and Chen measure and which can be applied to well-
known measures of poverty. They define a poverty equivalent growth rate (PEGR) as an 
index of pro-poor growth as follows: 



















   (8) 
where  γ * is the PGER and the expressions on the right-hand side are as follows: The 
numerator is cumulative change in the income of the poor weighted by changes in a 
specific measure of poverty, and the denominator is a normalizing factor representing 
total income of the pth percentile weighted by changes in a specific measure of poverty. 
The broad distinction in the debate is between measures that look at the relative growth 
rate of the incomes of the poor and those that look at absolute income changes of the 
poor. In the latter type of definition even very unequal growth can improve the real 
incomes of the poor and improve their welfare.  
To see some empirical implications of the choice of pro-poor growth indices, we report 
some estimates of pro-poor growth as they apply to selected African countries in the 
Appendix. The picture we get is that more growth or recession episodes are 
characterized as pro-poor under the first White and Anderson measure than under the 
Kakwani and Pernia measure. The first measure classifies 57 per cent of the growth and 
recession episodes as being pro-poor, while the second index classifies only 40 per cent 
of them as pro-poor. The two measures come up with similar classifications only in 
45 per cent of the cases. In the Kakwani-Pernia case, the pro-poor index is problematic 
in situations where recession leads to a reduction in poverty due to a decline in income 
inequality. An example is given in Table 4 where recessions that led to significant 
reduction in poverty could not be classified unambiguously. In fact, if one follows the 
definitions provided in Kakwani and Pernia (2000), a value exceeding one is considered 
pro-poor and pro-rich otherwise. According to this definition, thus, the recession 
episodes in Table 4 are pro-rich, which clearly is not the case.  8 
Table 4 




 in per capita GDP (%) 
Change 
 in the headcount (%)
Kakwani-Pernia 
 index 
Côte d’Ivoire  1985-88  -1.77  -3.99  -0.735 
Senegal 1991-94  -2.11  -9.60  -0.185 
Tanzania 1991-93  -1.76  -14.35  -0.071 
Source:   Authors’ calculations. 
 
One conclusion emerges from the estimates; even in times of economic decline, there 
are several cases where the poor did not suffer very severely (this is also reported in 
Christiaensen, Demery and Paternostro 2002). That is, poverty did not increase as a 
consequence of economic decline (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia). Still, as far as poverty reduction and pro-
poor strategy are concerned, distributional changes and growth both have a vital role to 
play. The next two sections deal with these issues. 
4  The equity-growth tradeoff 
At the heart of the above discussion on the measurement of pro-poor growth lies the 
issue of income distribution change as an essential component of poverty reduction in 
such regions as Africa. At the analytical level any poverty measure can be defined over 
per capita income and a measure of income inequality (Kakwani 1991; Ravallion 1992). 
By using this feature we can get some idea of the order of magnitudes involved in 
redistribution efforts for poverty reduction. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
This figure carries two messages. One is that, by definition, poverty levels in a country 
can be generated using information on the per capita income and the distribution of that 
income (and the poverty line). 
 
Figure 2 
Per capita income-inequality tradeoff 
P2
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According to Equation (9), if we know the level of the poverty line, z, mean per capita 
income, µ, and the distribution underlying that per capita income, G, it is possible to 
obtain a measure of poverty that is consistent with standard axioms.9, 10 Poverty rises 
with the poverty line and the Gini coefficient, and declines with per capita income. It is 
homogenous of degree zero with respect to z and µ. Using these properties of the 
poverty index, from (9) we can generate a set of per capita income and Gini coefficients 
that give rise to a given level of poverty that is iso-poverty curves as depicted above. 
This relationship has been innovatively utilized in Bourguignon (2002) as well as Ashan 
and Oberi (2002) to establish the link between economic growth and poverty reduction 
in a consistent and analytically appealing manner. Assuming that the poverty lines 
remain constant over time, we can link per capita income and the Gini to generate a 
locus of points for a given level of poverty as shown in Figure 2. The slope of the 
iso-poverty curve is the issue of concern here. Figure 2 assumes convex iso-poverty 
curves, where the second-order condition depends on the second derivatives of the 
poverty function with respect to µ and G, and the interactions between µ and G. If we 
follow Kakwani, Kandhker and Son (2003), we tend to get this convex shape for the 
iso-poverty curves.11 Bourguignon (2002) used the decomposition that follows from the 
definition of poverty (á la Kakwani 1991 and Datt and Ravallion 1992) to estimate the 
elasticity of poverty with respect to economic growth, taking the impact of 
distributional changes fully into account. This leads to a specification of an econometric 
model that can be used to estimate the connection between growth, poverty and income 
inequality.  
If there is any theoretically or empirically motivated structural relationship between 
income inequality and per capita income, there is an opportunity to super-impose this on 
the definition-driven iso-poverty curve and work out possible growth paths for a given 
country. Here our interest is to get an idea of what it takes in terms of growth and 
distributional change to maintain a given level of poverty, since there is a tradeoff 
between inequality and growth. 
Regarding the tradeoff, we can get some idea by looking at the slope of the iso-poverty 
curves. We can derive the magnitudes involved by totally differentiating (9) and setting 
changes in poverty equal to zero.  
                                                 
9  These axioms mainly are axiom of focus, monotonicity, transfer, sub-group consistency, 
decomposability Hagenaars 1987 for an interesting and in depth discussion of the properties of 
poverty indices). 
10 Bourguignon (2002, figure 3) uses G on the vertical axis and 
µ
z  on the horizontal axis to depict an iso-
poverty curve, which is downward sloping for a given poverty line. His main concern is to address the 
heterogeneity often reported in the elasticity of poverty with respect to economic growth.   
11 If we follow the common practice in the empirical literature (e.g. Besely and Burgess 2002; Fosu 
2002; Ali 1996), where log of poverty is regressed over log of income inequality and per capita 
income, to get elasticity values we can think of a Cobb-Douglas specification for the poverty function 



















− =  (10) 
and we can rewrite equation (10) as 
ε
θ
− = v  (11) 
where v is elasticity of per capita income with respect to the Gini, θ  is elasticity of 
poverty with respect to Gini and ε  is elasticity of poverty with respect to mean income. 
If v is small, (say <1), the effectiveness of redistribution as a tool for poverty reduction 
would tend to be small. When the elasticity is high, on the other hand, the payoff for a 
strategy of redistribution would be substantial. We have computed this elasticity for 27 
countries in Africa as reported in Table 4 using headcount ratio as our measure of 
poverty.  
To retain the same level of poverty, the extent of tradeoff between growth and income 
distribution depends on the slope of the iso-poverty curve. Suppose a country wishes to 
remain on one iso-poverty curve (see, for example, Ali and Elbadawi 1999), then it may 
have a choice between a policy that increases mean incomes and increases inequality 
and another one that lowers per capita incomes but reduces inequality. The extent of the 
tradeoff depends on the ratio of the elasticity of poverty with respect to income 
distribution and per capita income as shown in Table 4.  
For most African countries, this ratio is quite small, suggesting that there is little to gain 
in terms of poverty reduction from redistribution policy. For countries with high initial 
inequality, such as Gabon, South-Africa, and Zimbabwe, the inequality-growth tradeoff 
is high. In those cases there will be a significant poverty reduction impact also from 
small reductions in inequality. It is important to notice that the elasticity varies 
considerably at the point where the poverty line is located and the slope of the Lorenz 
curve at that point. Nevertheless, Table 4 gives an illustration of the tradeoff between 
growth and redistribution in Africa. One has to be cautious in interpreting these 
elasticities since they are essentially mechanical, non-behavioural relations. 
In Table 5 we apply two different poverty lines to compute the slope of the iso-poverty 
curve. These are the US$1 and US$2 a day per person amounts that are often used in 
cross-country poverty comparisons. Had the data been available, it would have been 
more sensible to use national poverty lines to evaluate the elasticity ratios to determine 
how a movement along an iso-poverty curve behaves with changes in either income 
inequality or per capita income. We could not compute the relevant elasticities for some 
countries, particularly for the relatively high-income countries when the poverty line 
was set at US$1 a day per person. It was too low to compute poverty estimates.12 
Nevertheless, we can observe at least three factors from Table 4. 
                                                 
12 We have used the POVCAL programme by Ravallion, Chen and Datt of the World Bank. This 
programme returns no results (or run time error) if the poverty line is set either too low or too high 
compared to the mean. 11 
One is that high-inequality and relatively high-income countries (for example, Namibia, 
South  Africa, Senegal, Gabon, Zimbabwe) had higher elasticity of the iso-poverty 
curve, indicating that redistribution policies may be effective tools in dealing with 
poverty in those countries. For instance, if we take South Africa, at the poverty line 
close to US$750 per person a year, a one per cent decline in the measure of income 
inequality needs about 9 per cent decline in per capita income to remain on the same 
poverty level. That means that any reduction in per capita income less than 9 per cent, 
following a one per cent decline in the Gini, would lead to a reduction in poverty. It 
takes a large reduction in per capita income following a one per cent reduction in the 
Gini for poverty not to decline. On the other hand, any increase in income inequality, 
beyond its current level, requires a large per capita income growth to maintain the 
existing level of poverty. 
The second point to note is that, for low-income countries, such as Burundi, Burkina 
Faso, Niger, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia, the room for poverty reduction via 
redistribution is very limited. A one per cent reduction in income inequality would need 
a small change in per capita income just to stay on the same level of poverty. The iso-
poverty curves for these countries are more flat. Likewise, the effect of rising income 
inequality on poverty would be offset by a low rate of growth in per capita income. An 
increase in inequality may not be a significant poverty threat if there is high rate of 
growth in these countries.  
Finally, we note that the elasticity is considerably higher at the lower poverty line. This 
would seem to suggest that redistribution policies are relatively more beneficial for the 
very poor. What it shows, when we use the headcount index as our measure of poverty, 
is that there are more people just below the poverty line of one dollar than immediately 
below the poverty line of two dollars. 
The main message of this section is, thus, that the tradeoff between redistribution and 
growth as tools of a poverty policy vary quite a lot by country. Depending on the order 
of magnitude involved in the tradeoff, the best choice of a pro-poor growth path varies. 
We should add, however, that our estimates are based entirely on the definition of 
poverty, with no inherent functional relationship between growth and income inequality. 
If there is a structural relationship between the two, as there is, then the choices that a 
country has may be restricted. The much harder question to analyse is how different 
pro-poor policies affect the growth rate of the economy. This requires such analytical 
tools as economy-wide equilibrium models, which would take us beyond the simple 
analysis of this paper. 
Still, to extend this simple analysis somewhat, we can show the poverty outcomes of 
two growth scenarios for four countries. One scenario is that income inequality remains 
unchanged (or distribution neutral growth, DNG) and the other scenario is that 
additional income is equally distributed; that is, growth follows an equally distributed 
growth (EDG) path. This is the second measure of White and Anderson (2000) 
discussed above. The latter is, of course, an extreme definition of pro-poor growth, but 
we include it to illustrative the sensitivity of poverty to distributional changes. We look 
at three countries considered by African standards to be success cases; that is, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, and Uganda. We then also add one high-inequality, high average income 
country—South Africa. In all cases, we also compare the outcomes of our simulations 
with actual changes in poverty.   12 
Table 5 











Per capita income 
 (in 1996 PPP) 
Burundi 1992  1.54  0.268  33.33  926 
Burkina Faso  1994  1.67  0.325  48.20  971 
Botswana 1986  –  0.510  54.21  3,895 
CAR 1993 –  0.789  61.33  1,306 
Côte d'Ivoire  1993  –  1.700  36.91  1,970 
Ethiopia 1995  0.60  -0.213  40.00  583 
Gabon 1960 7.14  3.056 64.00  2,966 
Ghana 1997 2.54  0.940 32.70  1,416 
Guinea 1994  6.28  2.742  46.80  2,732 
Gambia 1992  2.71  0.797  47.80  1,312 
Kenya 1994 2.34  0.669  57.50 1,215 
Lesotho 1993  5.06 2.022  57.94  2,215 
Morocco 1984  –  3.439 39.19  3,242 
Madagascar 1993  1.43 0.216  43.44  888 
Mali 1994  1.35  0.172  50.50  854 
Mozambique 1996  1.75  0.371  39.61  1,003 
Mauritania 1995  2.83 0.914  38.90  1,399 
Namibia 1993  11.46  –  74.30  4,541 
Niger 1995  0.61  0.205  50.50  880 
Nigeria 1997  1.93  0.467  50.56 1,072 
Rwanda 1984  –  0.518  28.90  1,108 
Senegal 1994  3.10  1.050  41.28  1,498 
Tunisia 1971  –  2.949  53.00  2882 
Tanzania 1993  0.51  -0.240 38.20  553 
Uganda 1993  1.16  0.083  39.20  788 
South Africa  1993 –  8.924  62.30  7,289 
Zambia 1996  1.40  0.205  49.80  876 
Zimbabwe 1990  –  3.031  56.83  2,948 
Source:   Authors’ computation. 
 
Table 6 
Simulation of the impact of pattern of growth on poverty in Ethiopia 
Year  Real per capita GDP 









1995  583  42.0 41.0 42.0 41.0 
1996  600  40.0 41.0 36.0 39.0 
1997  618  38.0 41.0 33.0 38.0 
1998  637  37.0 41.0 29.0 37.0 
1999  656  34.0 41.0 26.0 36.0 
2000  675  32.0 41.0 20.0 35.0 
Source: Authors’  calculation. 
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Table 6 reports the impact of the two types of growth patterns mentioned above on 
Uganda based on GDP in PPP from Penn World Tables using a poverty line of US$1 
per day. We took the average growth rate in real per capita GDP that prevailed in 
1993-2000, which was 3 per cent, as our measure of the long-term growth that can be 
sustained by the economy.13 One type of growth pattern is a situation where the Gini 
coefficient remains unchanged (or distribution neutral growth, DNG) throughout the 
growth episode. The other is an equally distributed growth pattern, where all additional 
income is divided equally across the population. It can be seen that even under a DNG, 
poverty in Ethiopia would have declined by 10 percentage points 1995-2000, a very 
significant reduction.  
In the second—the utopian—scenario, where additional income is equally distributed, 
Ethiopia could have halved poverty by 2000! It would have required a reduction in the 
Gini coefficient of 6 percentage points and a 3 per cent per capita growth in this period. 
What, in actual fact, would mean a reduction of such order in the Gini coefficient? In 
our case, it means that the income of the richest quintile would grow only by 8 per cent 
in this period, while the income of the poorest quintile would grow by nearly 50 per 
cent! 
Bigsten et al. (2003) showed that poverty (using consumption based estimates) declined 
by 5 percentage points between 1994 and 1997, while the Gini coefficient increased by 
4 percentage points. This suggests that the impact of growth on poverty in Ethiopia was 
less than what it would have been under the distribution neutral scenario. One might in 
this case argue that this increase was hard to avoid. During the period considered, 
Ethiopia was in transition from conflict. During conflict episodes it is particularly the 
transaction intensive sectors that decline, while the subsistence activities on which the 
poorest depend decline less. When peace is restored, the transaction intensive sectors 
are bound to bounce back, and it is thus natural to expect an increase in inequality. This 
effect of a return to normalcy is not to be deplored.  However, over the longer term it is 
important for Ethiopia to be aware of the distributional consequences of policy choices. 
We also look at the poverty impact of growth patterns in Mozambique and Uganda. 
Here we computed poverty based on GDP estimates in PPP from Penn World Tables 
and using a poverty line of US$2 a day per person. Tables 7 and 8 report the distribution 
neutral growth and equally distributed growth patterns for Mozambique and Uganda, 
which were among the fastest growing African economies in the 1990s. Mozambique’s 
per capita GDP grew at a rate of 3.1 per cent between 1990-2000, while that of Uganda 
grew at a rate of 3.3 per cent during the same period. 
It can be seen that Mozambique could have reduced poverty by about thirteen 
percentage points between 1996 and 2003 if growth remained distribution neutral. But 
the actual growth scenario of Mozambique did not translate into poverty reduction of 
that magnitude, although the country did manage to reduce poverty by 9 percentage 
points during the 1990s (ECA 2003). The growth pattern of Mozambique was thus 
similar to that of Ethiopia with a strong recovery in the modern sector. Again, one could  
                                                 
13 See World Bank (2002) for the per capita growth figure. In addition, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development (2002) believes that Ethiopia would achieve a 3 per cent per capita growth 
easily for in the coming decades.   14 
Table 7 
Simulation of pattern of growth on poverty in Mozambique 
 
Year 
Per capita GDP 









1996  1003  48 40 48 40 
1997  1034  46 40 43 39 
1998  1066  44 40 42 38 
1999  1133  42 40 40 37 
2000  1168  40 40 35 35 
2001  1204  39 40 32 34 
2002  1241  37 40 29 34 
2003  1280  35 40 23 32 
Source: Authors’  calculation. 
 
Table 8 
Simulation of pattern of growth on poverty in Uganda 
 
Year 










1993  788  62 40.0 62 40.0 
1994  814  60 40.0 59 38.0 
1995  841  58 40.0 57 37.0 
1996  868  56 40.0 54 36.6 
1997  897  54 40.0 51 34.5 
1998  926  52 40.0 49 34.0 
1999  957  50 40.0 45 32.0 
2000  989  48 40.0 42 31.0 
2001  1021  46 40.0 38 29.6 
2002  1055  44 40.0 34 29.0 
2003  1090  42 40.0 29 28.0 
Source: Authors’  calculation 
 
Table 9 











1993 22.0  62  22.0  62.0 
1994 21.5  62  20.0  61.5 
1995 21.7  62  19.7  61.2 
1996 21.6  62  19.6  61.2 
1997 21.3  62  19.5  61.1 
1998 20.7  62  16.8  59.0 
1999 20.6  62  16.7  58.6 
2000 20.5  62  16.5  58.2 
2001 20.4  62  11.2  57.2 
Source:   Authors’ computations at a poverty line of 3 USD per day per person in PPP. 
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argue that the role of pro-poor growth should increase, once the economy gets richer 
and returns to normalcy. To maintain the existing level of inequality the government 
would probably have to introduce deliberate egalitarian policy measures. 
Uganda managed to reduce poverty during the period 1992-2000 by 22 percentage 
points according to the consumption poverty estimates by Appleton (2001). The positive 
distributional outcome for Uganda was largely driven by the recovery in cash-crop 
agriculture. The recent dramatic decline in coffee prices may partly have reversed the 
positive picture evident until 2000. Still, our simulations show that the poverty impact 
of growth that is distribution-neutral is very significant. If Uganda could achieve at least 
such a pattern of growth and maintain the GDP growth rate, the country would certainly 
meet the MDG of poverty reduction well before 2015.   
Finally, we simulate the development in a high-inequality country, namely South Africa 
(Table 9). Per capita income in South Africa hardly increased over the last decade. The 
average growth in real per capita GDP between 1993 and 2000 was about 0.5 per cent. 
Taking this as a proxy to long-term growth (though one may hope for a growth recovery 
after the transition in South Africa), we see that such growth does not have much impact 
on poverty. The slow growth in per capita GDP and the very high level of income 
inequality provide a case for policy measures that focus on redistribution. The impact of 
such redistribution on incentive structure, productivity and growth is uncertain, but 
some forms of transfers might actually even speed up the process of growth. The results 
of the simulation of the radically egalitarian growth pattern show that in a high-income 
country even slow growth generates large resources that can potentially be used to fight 
poverty. 
In short, the preceding discussion illustrates the potential poverty impact of policies that 
target both distribution and growth. The big challenge, however, is to identify policy 
instruments that address both growth and distributional issues in the context of Africa. 
The next section looks briefly at some of the challenges of addressing distributional 
issues in the African context. 
5  The challenges of pro-poor growth strategies 
We have observed that average incomes in Africa are very low at the same time as 
inequality is quite high. So there are two problems for policymakers to worry about, 
namely how to increase aggregate growth and how to improve the distribution of the 
proceeds of this growth. There has been a very extensive debate about the growth 
failure of African countries referred to as ‘Africa’s growth tragedy’ by Easterly and 
Levine (1997). Here we will not enter into this general debate. It may suffice to note 
that growth tends to be high in environments that have the following characteristics: 
macroeconomic stability and a realistic exchange rate, competitive domestic markets, a 
stable financial system, an abundance of human capital, an effective physical 
infrastructure, unbiased institutions, good governance, political maturity, a broad-based 
development pattern, limited aid dependence, and a controlled level of foreign debt. 
Here, we confine our discussion to policies that can improve the poverty reduction 
impact of growth and thus make it pro-poor. Again, this is not an easy analytical task. 
To understand the determinants of income distribution, one needs to understand the 16 
process that generates the income pattern. The income distribution of a country is the 
outcome of the whole economic process, where factor prices are determined within an 
interdependent system. To analyse changes in income distribution properly, it would 
thus be very useful to use an economy-wide computable general equilibrium model, 
where it is possible to identify the variables that drive both economic growth and 
income distribution in a given setting. Without such information, it is difficult for 
policymakers to implement pro-poor growth policies. 
The importance of the pattern of growth for poverty reduction was discussed already in 
the 1970s under the label ‘growth with redistribution’ (Chenery et al. 1974). The issue 
was out of favour during the 1980s, when policy debate centred on macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural adjustment. The World Development Report of 1990 (World 
Bank 1990) reflected a renewed focus on poverty, and argued for a three-pronged pro-
poor development strategy. The three pillars of the strategy were that it should increase 
demand for the assets of the poor, it should help build up the assets of the poor, and 
there should also be a safety-net for those that could not earn money in the market. 
During the 1990s poverty gained in importance in the policy debate. At present the base 
for development lending and strategy are the poverty reduction strategy papers and the 
poverty reduction growth facilities. Stern (2003) notes that there are two main 
components in a strategy for pro-poor growth. First, it should create a good investment 
climate and thus generate aggregate growth, and second, there should be empowerment 
and investment in poor people so that they can participate in the growth. 
The first point we would like to note is that the sector focus of development efforts has 
a strong bearing on the poverty impact. Growth patterns where agriculture and other 
rural activities figure prominently generally have a good distributional profile.  
There are also significant regional or urban vs. rural differences in incomes (Bigsten 
1980, Bigsten et al. 2003). In general, inequality in urban areas tends to be higher than 
in rural areas in most parts of Africa. Similarly, within urban and rural areas, inequality 
tends to vary across agro-climatic zones and economic sectors (such as formal versus 
informal, service versus manufacturing). As much as the sources of growth are 
important to account for overall economic growth, it is also important to have 
disaggregated information on the sources of income inequality. Such exercises have 
been done for poverty in the literature (for example, Ravallion and Datt 2002 for India) 
trying to capture the effect of changes in the regional and sectoral distribution of income 
on overall reduction of poverty. The findings suggest that initial inequality interacts 
with such factors as literacy, farm productivity, and asset distribution affect the impact 
of growth on poverty. 
Standard explanations of income inequality relate to the underlying asset distribution. 
Several studies have shown land distribution in particular to be important in the 
determination of income inequality. However, in terms of the Gini coefficient for land 
distribution, Sub-Saharan Africa is the least unequal region (Deininger and Squire 
1998). Physical and human capital, however, are scarce in Africa, and their distribution 
is highly skewed. This certainly contributes very significantly to the extent of 
inequality. Still, a policy of redistribution is politically difficult. Asset redistribution 
may have costs in terms of lost growth. These could arise from efficiency and output 
losses from one-off redistribution, or through the impact on investment incentives. 17 
Widespread poverty is often accompanied by several forms of market imperfections, 
indivisibility of investment, and strategic complementarities among economic agents 
can have a dampening effect on economic growth (see Lustig, Arias and Regolini 2002 
for a review of the literature). Credit rationing in these economies makes it very difficult 
for poor people to break out of the poverty trap. The strategic complementarities 
introduce the issue of coordination failures, where incentives for the expropriation of 
other people’s wealth dominate the strategy of individual economic agents. Poverty 
itself generates a high degree of risk aversion and reduces the incentive for investment. 
One policy implication is for governments to invest in basic infrastructures, such as 
physical and financial infrastructures, that reduce transaction cost to individuals. 
Redistribution of assets, such as land, can also ease the credit constraint poor people 
face. 
Another aspect highly correlated with poverty is the low level of human development, 
which in itself affects subsequent growth. The literature has indicated that better 
education and health are very important for economic growth, and thus for poverty 
reduction. Analyses of poverty profiles confirm that the poor have relatively low level 
of education and health. One reason is the very fact that they are poor. The opportunity 
cost of sending children to school for poor households is higher than in better-off 
households. Against this background it is clear that the efficiency and composition of 
public expenditures are critical determinants of growth and poverty. This is an area 
where African countries face extremely serious problems. The countries are generally 
good at producing well-written strategy papers and PRSPs, but they have immense 
problems in getting the day to day work of the administration to function with civil 
servants who are underpaid, badly trained, and poorly motivated. Provision of public 
services is constrained by low levels of public revenue, which could, in principle, be 
solved by higher levels of taxation. However, in some countries, rapidly increased 
taxation might pose a severe constraint on private investment, and thus might impact 
negatively on future growth, and hence on revenue collection as well. 
The Development Report 2000 extended the concept of poverty beyond income and 
consumption plus education and health, to include risk and vulnerability, as well as 
voicelessness and powerlessness. Poor households are susceptible to a wide range of 
risks, some which are idiosyncratic, such as illness, while others are common, such as 
natural disasters. As a result, poor households may adopt production plans or 
employment strategies to reduce their exposure to the risk, even if this entails lower 
average income. Poor households may also try to smooth consumption by creating 
buffer stocks, withdrawing children from school, and developing credit and insurance 
arrangements. Social networks also help provide informal insurance. Still, there are 
limits to the usefulness of networks that do not extend outside the local community. 
This makes them very vulnerable to natural disasters and economic shocks, since 
geographically confined networks provide little protection against shocks of this type. In 
such instances the government needs to intervene with targeted measures. It is very 
hard for African governments to target the poor, since the required information is often 
lacking. The government, therefore, has to devise other methods of reaching the poor 
such as indicator targeting or self-targeting.  
Finally, along with these factors are the ill feeling and social unrest that widespread 
poverty instils among members of society. Poverty undermines stability, well-
functioning institutions, and good governance. Many African countries have gone 
through destructive civil wars, conflicts, and social upheavals in the recent past. A 18 
major cause of such instability is poverty itself. The challenge for Africa, therefore, is to 
ensure a growth process that benefits the larger segment of the poor population. 
6 Conclusion 
Countries that have been successful in terms of aggregate economic growth have 
generally been successful in reducing poverty. How strong a poverty-reducing effect 
growth has, depends on what happens to income distribution. This paper has 
investigated some dimensions of income distribution in Africa. The focus has been on 
the link between changes in average per capita income and the incomes of the poor. We 
have estimated different pro-poor growth indexes. The results suggest that, in several 
cases, economic declines have affected the poor surprisingly little. On the other hand, 
there were also cases where the poor did not benefit from economic growth, which led 
to rising poverty.  
Using the definition of income poverty as a function of income distribution and per 
capita income, this paper has attempted to show the implied tradeoff between the two 
that exists to maintain a given level of poverty. Such tradeoffs illustrate the choices 
open to different countries between growth and redistribution depending on their level 
of inequality and per capita income. High inequality and high-income countries were 
found to have a higher value of the elasticity of the iso-poverty curve, indicating that 
redistribution policies for poverty reduction may be more effective there. For most of 
these countries, if inequality were to increase further, the rate of growth in per capita 
income needed to maintain existing levels of poverty is very substantial. Thus, policies 
that lead to a further rise in income inequality must have a very strong growth effect for 
the poor to benefit. On the other hand, low-income countries tended to have had on 
average flatter iso-poverty curves, implying that a one per cent increase in income 
inequality needs a much lower rise in per capita income to stay at the same level of 
income inequality. Here growth strategies leading to inequality are more acceptable 
from a poverty point of view, provided that they generate sufficient growth. 
There may be a conflict between short-term distributional measures and immediate 
poverty reduction on the one hand, and long-term growth-supporting measures and 
long-term poverty reduction, on the other. But there may also be win-win situations, 
where a policy for equity has a beneficial effect on growth. Typically, those policies 
have built up the assets of the poor, and helped increase the demand for those assets. 
This has meant, for example, expansion of education (building up assets), and measures 
that increase the relative prices of agricultural commodities and the wages of unskilled 
labour (increasing demand). Along with measures to secure long-term growth of the 
incomes of the poor, there is a need for transfer schemes that help households to cope 
with risk, which is high for many poor groups. 
The main point is that without growth in per capita incomes, poverty will persist. 
Governments intent on poverty reduction must, therefore, create an environment that is 
conducive to growth. For the efforts to be effective, the government must develop good 
institutions, and provide good governance. The way in which the interaction between 
civil society and the government is played out will have major implications for the 
growth outcome. Understanding the nature of domestic politics is thus a key to 
successful economic reform. 19 
Poverty can generally be reduced if there is sufficient economic growth, and it can be 
reduced faster if it has a pro-poor pattern. Growth can be substantial if the policy and 
institutional environment is right, but some aspects of the environment are hard to 
change, and some politicians may be unwilling to change them. This environment also 
determines the distribution of the proceeds of growth. It is therefore largely in the social 
and political arenas that scope for poverty reduction will be determined. It is important 
to complement the analysis of growth policy with the analysis of its distributional 
consequences. It has to be put on the political agenda to increase the chances of 
achieving rapid poverty reduction. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1 
Pro-poor growth measure for selected African countries 







 Kakwani and 
Pernia (φ ) 
Growth of GDP per 
capita: 1996 PPP 
Growth in the 
Gini index 
Côte d'Ivoire  1985 v 1993  2.72  4.063  -2.34  -1.37 
Côte d'Ivoire  1986 v 1993  0.08  1.687  -2.85  -0.64 
Côte d'Ivoire  1987 v 1993  1.42  2.274  -2.90  -1.34 
Côte d'Ivoire  1988 v 1993  0.78  1.326  -2.68  0.01 
Côte d'Ivoire  1985 v 1988  6.02  -0.735  -1.77  -3.62 
Côte d'Ivoire  1986 v 1988  -1.65  1.814  -3.27  -2.27 
Ethiopia  1981 v 1995  -1.33 1.085  -1.29  1.51 
Gambia  1991 v 1992  113.59  -0.206  -3.53  -14.83 
Ghana  1987 v 1997  1.88 0.458  1.11  -0.78 
Ghana  1988 v 1997  2.14 0.606  1.04  -1.03 
Ghana  1989 v 1997  2.36 0.975  1.05  -1.45 
Ghana  1992 v 1997  1.23 0.295  0.93  -0.72 
Ghana  1993 v 1997  1.39 0.437  0.72  -0.82 
Ghana  1987 v 1993  2.22 0.724  1.37  -0.75 
Ghana  1988 v 1993  2.75 0.387  1.30  -1.20 
Ghana  1989 v 1993  3.34 1.171  1.37  -2.07 
Ghana  1992 v 1993  0.63  -0.027 1.78  -0.32 
Ghana  1987 v 1992  2.54 0.40  1.29  -0.83 
Ghana  1988 v 1992  3.29 0.856  1.18  -1.42 
Ghana  1989 v 1992  4.26 1.738  1.24  -2.65 
Guinea  1991 v 1994  28.73  22.81  0.93  0.00 
Kenya  1992 v 1994  21.45  -0.014  -0.25  2.82 
Lesotho  1986 v 1993  -1.35 0.064  -0.10  0.48 
Lesotho  1987 v 1993  -1.57 0.206  -0.45  0.56 
Madagascar  1960 v 1993  1.24  -12.0  -2.34  -0.60 
Madagascar  1980 v 1993  1.28  -11.52  -2.93  -0.58 
Mali  1989 v 1994  -8.13  0.382  -1.90  6.70 
Mauritania  1988 v 1995  8.38 6.845  -0.03  -1.27 
Mauritania  1993 v 1995  9.62 -10.98  -1.12  -11.84 
Mauritania  1988 v 1993 7.89  -11.18  0.41  3.31 
Niger  1960 v 1995  -0.11  0.096  -1.73  1.14 
Niger  1992 v 1995  0.00  0.09  -0.86  11.84 
Niger  1960 v 1992  -0.12  0.096  -1.81  0.19 
Nigeria 1959  v1997  -1.24  2.12  0.47 -0.02 
Nigeria  1985 v 1997  -2.65  -3.857  0.42  2.26 
Nigeria  1986 v 1997  -4.16  -10.33  0.22  2.87 
Nigeria  1991 v 1997  1.45  6.253  -0.38  1.96 
Nigeria  1992 v 1997  -7.96  -3.055  0.88  4.20 
Nigeria  1993 v 1997  2.24  -0.95  3.37  7.78 
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Appendix Table 1 (con’t) 
Pro-poor growth measure for selected African countries 







 Kakwani and 
Pernia (φ ) 
Growth of GDP per 
capita: 1996 PPP 
Growth in the 
Gini index 
Nigeria 1959  v1993  -1.64  12.66  0.13 -0.90 
Nigeria  1985 v 1993  -5.01  0.791  -1.02  -0.40 
Nigeria  1986 v 1993  -7.64  0.554  -1.53  0.17 
Nigeria  1991 v 1993  -0.13  0.117  -7.48  -8.75 
Nigeria  1959 v 1992  -0.18  5.139  0.40  -0.65 
Nigeria  1985 v 1992  1.32  -6.323  0.10  0.89 
Nigeria  1986 v 1992  -0.88  7.953  -0.32  1.78 
Nigeria  1985 v 1991  -6.59  -1.212  1.24  2.55 
Nigeria  1986 v 1991  -10.49  -3.894  0.96  3.98 
Rwanda  1983 v 1984  0.00  0.072  -9.70  0.00 
Senegal  1960 v 1994  2.27  -1.176  -0.81  -0.89 
Senegal  1991 v 1994  22.48  -5.416  -2.11  -8.63 
Senegal  1960 v 1991  0.50  -0.134  -0.68  -0.11 
Tanzania  1964 v 1993  1.21  15.04  0.09  -1.19 
Tanzania  1991 v 1993  66.94 -14.05  -1.76  -19.54 
Tanzania  1964 v 1991  -2.47  12.66  0.23  0.33 
Uganda  1989 v 1993  -6.18  -0.678  2.21  4.40 
Uganda  1992 v 1993  -2.65  1.604  3.96  -3.87 
Uganda  1989 v 1992  -7.33  -2.235  1.64  7.31 
Zambia  1959 v 1996  -1.09  0.032  -1.76  0.10 
Zambia  1976 v 1996  0.64  0.082  -3.37  -0.12 
Zambia  1991 v 1996  -5.49  0.535  -4.62  2.74 
Zambia  1993 v 1996  2.50  0.863  -2.84  2.53 
Zambia  1959 v 1993  -1.40  -0.02  -1.66  -0.11 
Zambia  1976 v 1993  0.31  -0.018  -3.46  -0.58 
Zambia  1991 v 1993  -16.32  0.522  -7.24  3.04 
Zambia  1959 v 1991  -0.38  -0.144  -1.30  -0.31 
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